GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2003

Unsigning
Edward T. Swaine
George Washington University Law School, eswaine@law.gwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061 (2003).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

SWAINE

6/1/2003 12:35 PM

Unsigning
Edward T. Swaine*
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 2061
I. THE FORMAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF SIGNATURE .................................... 2066
II. SIGNATURE AS A STRATEGIC PROBLEM ......................................................... 2071
A.
Ex Post and Ex Ante Considerations ................................................ 2072
1.
Ex post effects. .................................................................................. 2073
2.
Ex ante effects................................................................................... 2074
B.
The (In)Adequacy of Interim Obligations......................................... 2077
C.
Implications ...................................................................................... 2083
III. STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS ................................................................................ 2085
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 2089

INTRODUCTION
What accounts for the tumult over the Bush Administrationís decision to
ìunsignî the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)?1 On
its face, the decision was not only rational, but to everyoneís benefit. When
signing the Rome Statute, President Clinton restated American objections to the

* Assistant Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. I would like
to thank the colloquium organizers and its participants, particularly Curt Bradley, MarianoFlorentino CuÈllar, Eric Posner, and Judith Resnik, for comments at the colloquium and
afterwards. Errors remain my own.
1. The decision was formally conveyed in a letter from Under Secretary of State John
Bolton to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, see Letter from John R. Bolton,
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, to U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2002/9968.htm, in keeping with the latterís role as the treaty depositary. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter
Rome Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. The decision
was also announced on the same day by other U.S. officials, who sought to elaborate on its
rationale. See Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, American
Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and
International
Studies,
Washington,
D.C.
(May
6,
2002),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/p/9949.htm; Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes
Issues, Issues Update: US Has No Legal Obligation to the International Criminal Court (May
6, 2002), available at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/unsigning/prosperunsigning.html;
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/b05062002_bt233-02.html.
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ICCís jurisdiction,2 claimed that his intention in signing was to maintain an
avenue for changing the court,3 and signaled that he would not submit the
treaty to the Senate unless significant revisions were madeóand would
recommend that his successor likewise refrain.4 Whatever promise for
eventual ratification this tack once held disappeared when the Bush
Administration made known that it sided with the Senate in categorically
opposing U.S. participation.5 Rather than maintaining an ambiguous or
duplicitous stance, the United States simply reverted to the status it might have
retained all alongónamely, that of a nonparty6óby complying punctiliously
with the notice required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to
which the United States is not even a party.7 Unsigning, on this view, was
simply being forthright, and by providing more accurate information about the
U.S. position, better enabled other signatories and nonparties to promote their
own interests.8
Many did not see it that way, however. The widespread disapproval of the
U.S. decision is probably easiest to understand in substantive terms. Those
having faith in the ICC would have preferred full-fledged U.S. participation,
and disliked unsigning because it signaled a decisive setback for that
2. William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, Statement on Signature of
the International Criminal Court Treaty, Washington, D.C., at 1 (Dec. 31, 2000), 37 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Jan. 8, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/
00123101.htm.
3. Id. (ìWith signature, however, we will be in a position to influence the evolution of
the court. Without signature, we will not. Signature will enhance our ability to further
protect US officials from unfounded charges and to achieve the human rights and
accountability objectives of the ICC.î).
4. Id. (ìThe United States should have the chance to observe and assess the functioning
of the court, over time, before choosing to become subject to its jurisdiction. Given these
concerns, I will not, and do not recommend that my successor . . . submit the treaty to the
Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied.î).
5. For early indications, see Bill Nichols, Bush Voices Objection to Court Treaty, USA
TODAY, Jan. 3, 2001, at 6A (noting opposition by President-elect Bush and Secretary of
Defense-nominee Donald Rumsfeld, as well as Senate opposition); David R. Sands, Powell
Previews Bush Agenda, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at A3 (describing confirmation
hearings for Secretary of State-nominee Colin Powell, and concluding from his remarks that
the Rome Statute would be ìquickly abandonedî).
6. As President Clinton noted in signing the treaty, however, one of the principal U.S.
objections to the Rome Statute was its concern that the court could exercise authority over
the personnel of nonparty states. See Clinton, supra note 2 (noting that ì[i]n particular, we
are concerned that when the court comes into existence, it will not only exercise authority
over personnel of states that have ratified the Treaty, but also claim jurisdiction over
personnel of states that have notî).
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; see infra text accompanying note 45 (quoting article 18).
8. See Steven Mufson & Alan Sipress, UN Funds in Crossfire over Court, WASH.
POST, Aug. 16, 2001, at A1 (citing senior administration officialís opinion that, given Senate
opposition to the Rome Statute, providing notice of unsigning ìwould arguably just be
stating the truthî).
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possibilityóand the end to any obligation the United States assumed as a
signatory. But this substantive explanation is also incomplete. The United
Statesís longstanding objections to certain basic aspects of the courtís
operation, and its failure (despite concerted effort) to persuade other
negotiating states of those objectionsí merits, make it implausible that
remaining a signatory would have led it to participate harmoniously in the new
regime9ólet alone to engage in what Harold Koh has labeled ìan international
Marbury versus Madison moment.î10 If so, ICC-based objections to unsigning
were either highly optimistic or preoccupied with the gestureís symbolism.11
International lawyers also regarded the mere act of unsigning as significant
in itself. Some seemed to think it impossible,12 and the European Unionís

9. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and
the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 404 (2002) (concluding prior to
unsigning that, given political opposition within the United States and the defeat of U.S.proposed revisions, ìthe United States is very unlikely either to join or to support the
International Criminal Court at any time in the foreseeable futureî). For a thorough
explication of the reasons for signingóalbeit on the assumption that U.S. ratification
remained tenableósee David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal
Court, 35 CORNELL INTíL L.J. 47, 55-68 (2002). See also id. at 73-86 (describing progress
achieved in resolving U.S. objections); id. at 98-99 (describing steps that might be taken to
resolve continuing concerns).
10. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2002, at A18.
11. I do not mean to suggest that such concerns were misplaced, or that the bases for
U.S. opposition (and, ultimately, the unsigning) were persuasive, but only to focus attention
on the nature of the criticisms lodged against the ultimate decision to unsign. It is important
to consider, certainly, whether the act of unsigning was harmful because it was perceived as
part of a broader U.S. rejection of cooperative internationalism. It bears mention, however,
that the United Statesís aggressive negotiating position during the development of the Rome
Statute had already given rise to that perception, well before the treaty was (surprisingly)
signed, and it may be doubted whether any active attempt by the United States to renew its
campaign would have been welcome. Cf. William K. Lietzau, International Criminal Law
After Rome: Concerns from a U.S. Military Perspective, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
2001, at 119, 119 (describing perception that cheers by delegates approving the text of the
Rome Statute were ìas much to celebrate the defeat of the United States, which had
demanded the vote, as they were to applaud the adoption of the textî).
12. It was unclear whether this objection was legal or just semantic. See Michael J.
Kelly, Imperfect Justice, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 7, 2001, at B7 (ìAmerica has already
signed the document. It cannot be ëunsigned.í Upon signature, the U.S. committed itself
under international law to refrain from acting in any manner to undermine the object and
purpose of the treaty. Consequently, we are already obligated to back the creation of this
court.î); accord Michael J. Kelly, Ignoring Criminal Treaty Harms U.S. Legacy, USA
TODAY, Apr. 16, 2002, at 12A. This view was, I should stress, unrepresentative. See, e.g.,
Anthony Aust, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES (London), May 9, 2002, at 18 (explaining that
unsigning ìsets no legal precedentî); Anthony Aust, Letter to the Editor, TIMES (London),
Apr. 5, 2002, at 25 (explaining that the interim obligation ceases ìonce the state ha[s] made
it clear that it will not ratify, and that has been evident for a long timeî); Curtis Bradley, U.S.
Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, May
2002 (explaining that providing notice of intent not to sign is consistent with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm.
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official reaction hedged as to its effect.13 It was, in any event, apparently
unprecedented,14 and a precedent some considered troubling. U.S. officials and
their political supporters urged the unsigning of a number of important treaties
that the United States has signed but not yet ratifiedósuch as the Kyoto
Protocol, the Biodiversity Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the ILO Convention on Race
Discrimination in Employment.15 Other states, such as Israel, are considering
the possibility with respect to the Rome Statute.16 Given the number of
unratified signatures to multilateral treaties, not to mention the number of
multilateral treaties still open to signature, the scope of the obligation imposed
on signatoriesóand the limits, if any, to unsigningóare questions of
considerable moment to treaty law. The former head of the U.S. delegation to
the ICC negotiations cautioned that ìthere is a whole list of treaties that weíve
ratified that other states have signed but not yet ratified. . . . If we ëunsigní the
ICC, we give a signal that a new practice is acceptable, and we lay the

13. Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Position of
the US Towards the International Criminal Court (May 13, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/declicc.htm (noting ìwith
disappointment and regretî the U.S. declaration that it does not intend to ratify the Rome
Statute ìand th[a]t it considers itself released from any legal obligation arising from its
signature of the Statuteî (emphasis added)).
14. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, The Presidentís Roman Holiday, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Sept. 5, 2002, at B11 (describing unsigning as ìunique in the history of international
law,î with ìU.N. officials indicat[ing] that no such precedent existsî); Lewis, supra note 10
(citing concurring views of U.N. and former U.S. officials).
15. Jeremy Rabkin, End Them, Donít Mend Them, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 22, 2001, at
18; see also David C. Scott, Presidential Power to ìUn-signî Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1447, 1447-48 (2002) (discussing background to President George W. Bushís position that
the United States should ìescape permanentlyî from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT)). Professor Rabkin also highlighted the possibility of unsigning the 1997
amendments to the ABM Treaty, but the United States subsequently gave formal notice that
it would withdraw from the underlying ABM Treaty altogether. Text of Diplomatic Notes
Sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Dec. 14, 2001), at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/6859.htm; Press Release, President Discusses
National Missile Defense (Dec. 13, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/12/print/20011213-4.html; infra text accompanying note 113; cf. Letter from Michael
Posner, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, to President George W.
Bush (Apr. 4, 2002), available at http://www.lchr.org/IJP/icc.htm (predicting that ICC
unsigning would ì[o]pen the floodgate to disaffected interested groups of all stripes seeking
to roll back U.S. signature on any number of treaties,î and citing examples); Letter from
Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, to President George W. Bush (May 3, 2002),
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/icc0506-ltr.htm (suggesting similar dynamic for United
States and other signatories).
16. Harvey Morris, Legal Move to Halt Israeli Assassinations, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 26, 2002, at 13.
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groundwork for undermining a whole range of treaties,î17 including for other
states desirably constrained by international law.18
Unsigning exposed a potentially significant flaw in the prevailing law of
treaties.19 Part I briefly explicates the legal consequences of signature under
the Vienna Convention, which is generally regarded as establishing default
rules for bilateral and multilateral treaties between states.20 As the relative
significance of ratification has increased, international lawyers have wrestled
with how to maintain the legal significance of treaty signatures; at least
following the Vienna Convention, the majority view is that ìmereî signatories
(states that have signed but not yet ratified the treaty in question) assume an
intermediate, interim obligation to refrain from frustrating the treatyís object
and purpose.
Part II, the heart of this Article, considers the interim obligation as a
potential solution to the strategic problems posed by signature. Within the
formalist perspective predominant among international lawyers, the interim
obligation is understood as a mechanism for retaining a vestigial role for
signature. I reconceive the interim obligation as a partial answer to ex post and
ex ante commitment problems observable in the treaty context and elsewhere,
but conclude that it is unable to resolve them satisfactorily. Were interim
obligations made effective, moreover, they would still destabilize multilateral
treaty regimes, since signatories can effectively withdraw from their obligations
without the delay that withdrawal provisions impose on ratifiers.
What, if anything, is to be done? Part III continues with an assessment of
the alternative legal mechanisms for addressing these strategic problems. After
considering other options, I propose a simple means of reducing the exit gap

17. Mufson & Sipress, supra note 8.
18. See, e.g., Ian Williams, Mary Quite Contrary, IN THESE TIMES (Chicago), Oct. 14,

2002, at 16 (citing opinion of Mary Robinson, outgoing U.N. Commissioner on Human
Rights, that ì[n]ow if other countries are under pressure on human rights instruments theyíve
signed, they may say, ëWell, if the U.S. can unsign a treaty, so can we.íî (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Letter from Michael Posner, supra note 15 (arguing that ICC unsigning
would ì[e]ncourage autocratic leaders to ignore the international commitments,î citing ìthe
U.S. precedent to justify backing out of international commitments that are important to the
U.S.î).
19. For reasons of space, I do not here address the constitutional questions that interim
obligations poseóchiefly for divided power systems like the United States, where the
Presidentís ability to bind the United States without Senate advice and consent is potentially
controversial. For discussions focusing on these domestic questions, see MICHAEL J.
GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 169-75 (1990); Scott, supra note 15.
20. As explained below, many states are not parties to the Vienna Convention, but it is
commonly regarded as stating the customary international law applicable to the questions
relevant hereóand a number of nonratifying parties, including the United States, have
declared as much. See infra text accompanying note 82. It is important to stress, however,
that for parties and nonparties alike, the Vienna Convention only states default principles of
treaty law, and individual treaties may directly or indirectly provide for a different rule.
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between withdrawal mechanisms and unsigning that diminishes any strategic
opportunities created by this emerging practice.
I. THE FORMAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF SIGNATURE
The history of the law of treaties, greatly simplified, supports a shift in
gravity from signature to ratification.21 Signature was generally regarded as
sufficient between monarchs or, for that matter, between their duly authorized
representatives. Even in the early twentieth century, dictators sometimes
personally negotiated, signed, and through those acts made binding treaties
along much the same lines.22 But separate ratification procedures also have an
ancient pedigree in international relations, have come to be required by
numerous national constitutions, and are now the default procedure for
international agreements.23
The relationship among negotiating authority, signature, and ratification
raises a host of technical issues, but at least one of potential consequence: If
ratification is required before a state can become a party, what significance
21. To be clear, I use ìratifyî and ìratificationî in the sense used by international
lawyersóthat is, to refer to a conclusive act by which a state party communicates its consent
to an international agreement to its treaty partners. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7,
art. 2 (explaining that for purposes of the Convention, ìëratificationí, ëacceptanceí,
ëapprovalí and ëaccessioní mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State
establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treatyî). Ratification is
also used to refer to internal procedures (like those under Article II of the U.S. Constitution)
that national law requires as a condition precedent for ratification in the international law
sense. The link between national and international procedures is obviously quite strong. But
it is possible that a treaty may be ratified in the international sense without having properly
been ratified according to domestic procedures, or that a treaty may have been ratified for
domestic purposes without having been satisfactorily communicated on the international
plane. See, e.g., G.G. Fitzmaurice, Do Treaties Need Ratification?, 15 Brit. Y.B. Intíl L.
113, 113-15 (1934).
22. JOS… SETTE CAMARA, THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 19-26
(1949); INGRID DETTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 18 (1967); FRANCIS O. WILCOX,
THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 21-23 (1935); Fitzmaurice, supra note
21, at 119; Harvard Research in Intíl Law, Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INTíL L. 653, 770
(1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
23. CAMARA, supra note 22, at 26-47; WILCOX, supra note 22, at 28-30; John Eugene
Harley, The Obligation to Ratify Treaties, 13 AM. J. INTíL L. 389, 389-93 (1919). But cf.
KAYE HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 40 (1967) (claiming broadly, and
implausibly, that ì[o]ne of the most significant aspects of trends in the evolution of treaty
law has been the growing importance of signature in all its aspectsî). Ratification is not, to
be sure, invariably required, but it has become the norm. Compare Fitzmaurice, supra note
21, at 129 (contending that ratification is unnecessary unless expressly or implicitly required
by a particular treaty), and Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 11 (recognizing that
treaties may provide for consent by ìsignature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty,
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreedî), with
CAMARA, supra note 22, at 43-44 (noting that in practice, ratification is ìessentially
necessaryî in light of overwhelming practice), and Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 12
(detailing conditions under which consent may be indicated by signature alone).
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remains for prior acts, particularly signature? To be sure, signature has some
recognizable, if often overlooked, consequences. Collectively, signature tends
to fix the treatyís substantive termsóat least in the absence of reservations.24
It also establishes the terms by which a treaty is to come into force, such as by
setting a time limit for ratification or stipulating the minimum number of
signatories.25
Commentators puzzled, however, over the significance of individual
signatures for state consent, a problem made more acute by widespread and
prolonged delays in ratification.26 Some conceded that the signature lacked
any legal effect,27 but most shrunk from such a nihilistic view. At the opposite
end of the spectrum, some claimed that signature created an obligation to
ratify.28 But this would basically divest ratification of significance, and in the
process slight the functional arguments for it. Because adding discrete stages
to the consent process may improve the likelihood of cooperation, rendering
ratification redundant may harm the objectives of treatymaking.29 Moreover,
to the extent that domestic ratification processes broaden participationóas in
the United States, where ratification increases public scrutiny, requires
legislative participation, and presents the executive branch with a second

24. Reservations are not, in fact, universally permitted. The Rome Statute, for
example, formally precluded them. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 20. In practice,
however, some states appear to have secured their functional equivalent. See Ruth
Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001, at 193, 19495 (citing examples of the prohibitionís application and circumvention).
25. See J. MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION 86 & n.2 (1949).
Signature may also invest the signatory with particular rights under the treaty. See infra text
accompanying notes 57, 106.
26. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 25, at 105-22.
27. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, Conflicts Between International Law and Treaties, 11
AM. J. INTíL L. 566, 568 n.9 (1917) (contending that ìa state which has signed but not
ratified a treaty is legally in the same situation as a state which has had nothing to do with
the instrumentî).
28. See Harley, supra note 23, at 404 (compiling authorities); Harvard Research, supra
note 22, at 770-72 (same).
29. John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INTíL L.J. 139, 148-50, 193-96 (1996)
[hereinafter Setear, An Iterative Perspective] (discussing signature as an iterative stage in
treatymaking); John K. Setear, Law in the Service of Politics: Moving Neo-Liberal
Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theory by Using the International Treaty Process to
Define ìIteration,î 37 VA. J. INTíL L. 641, 682-89 (1997) (same). Setear recognizes that
iteration models apply imperfectly to treatymaking, since (among other things) the graduated
structure of interactions is not the same as repeat plays to a game. On the other hand, it
should be noted that weak concerns about making ratification redundantófor example, that
signature and ratification might become functionally indistinguishableówould be
redemptive, rather than unfortunate, under the iteration model.
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opportunity to evaluate the treatyórequiring ratification on the international
plane may improve the credibility of treaty commitments.30
In any event, the argument for an obligation to ratify faded for more
conventional reasons. Such an obligation may have made more sense when
diplomats were regarded as personal agents of a head of state, and could be
viewed in terms of a conventional principal-agent relationship, but identifying
the principal (conceivably, the head of state, a legislature, or the state itself),
the agent (not only the envoy, but the head of state, too), and the nature and
consequences of delegated authority became less straightforward.31 Any such
obligation also had to confront the fact that states frequently do not ratify
treaties that they have signed, which is powerful evidence that no such
principle existed as a matter of customary international law.32 Perhaps mindful
of that problem, those presupposing a legal obligation to ratify, and even the
greater number regarding any such obligation as purely moral in character,
imagined categories of acceptable excuses: The exceeding of negotiating
powers, duress, conflict with prior or otherwise superior legal norms, or
fundamental changes in circumstances were all regarded as permissible bases
for nonratification.33 By the time the Harvard Research in International Law
project was compiling a code of treaty law, it felt comfortable stating
conclusively that there was no duty whatsoever to ratify a signed treaty.34
Special Rapporteurs to the International Law Commissionís subsequent efforts
at codification, which formed the basis for what became the Vienna
Convention, urged inclusion of a binding legal duty ì[t]o submit the instrument
to the proper constitutional authorities for examination with the view to
ratification,î35 but admitted that such a duty went beyond what existing law

30. See John K. Setear, The Presidentís Rational Choice of a Treatyís Preratification
Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S5 (2002).
31. See JONES, supra note 25, at 87 (noting strained character of agency under modern
practice).
32. See, e.g., Harley, supra note 23, at 397-403 (discussing examples); Harvard
Research, supra note 22, at 775-77 (citing frequency of failures to ratify, and absence of
their condemnation under international law); cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 (defining sources of law to
include ìinternational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as lawî).
33. See, e.g., WILCOX, supra note 22, at 103-04; Harley, supra note 23, at 397; see also
CAMARA, supra note 22, at 33-34 (noting ìelasticî nature of exceptions); Harvard Research,
supra note 22, at 771-73 (describing arguments favoring moral or legal obligations to ratify
and their qualifications).
34. Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 769 (stating, in article 8 of proposed code, that
ì[t]he signature of a treaty on behalf of a State does not create for that State an obligation to
ratify the treatyî).
35. Report by Mr. H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly, [1953]
2 Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 90, 108, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 [hereinafter
Lauterpacht Report] (detailing proposed article 5(2)(a)).
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provided,36 and that, together with the obligationís vague character, ultimately
doomed it.37
A third, intermediate possibility was that ratification, though necessary to
make an obligation binding, had an effect retroactive to the time of signature.38
Whatever the potential merits of that rule, it too was regarded as inconsistent
with the migration from ratification of the signature to ratification as a
separable mechanism for indicating consent.39 By the time of the Harvard
Research project in 1935, retroactive ratification was considered ìobsolete,î40 a
judgment reiterated in the International Law Commissionís proceedings.41
A fourth possibility, that endorsed by the Harvard project,42 the
International Law Commission,43 and ultimately by those negotiating the
36. Id. at 111.
37. See Report by G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, [1956] 2 Y.B. Intíl L.

Commín 104, 113, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101 (explicating proposed article 30); First Report on
the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, [1962] 2 Y.B. Intíl L.
Commín 27, 46, 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/144 (replicating similar duty, but noting lack of legal
basis and ìtenuous and imperfectî nature); Summary Records of the 14th Session, [1962] 1
Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 88, 88-96 (summarizing criticisms at the International Law
Commissionís 644th Meeting); id. at 96-100 (summarizing criticisms, and rejection of
proposal, at the International Law Commissionís 645th meeting); Fourth Report on the Law
of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, [1965] 2 Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 3,
36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/177 & addenda 1, 2 (explaining redaction); see also Richard D.
Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INTíL L. 495, 509 (1970)
(describing rejection of similarly progressive proposal that states must refrain from acts
tending to frustrate treaty objects during negotiations).
38. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 25, at 92-107; J. Mervyn Jones, The Retroactive Effect
of the Ratification of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INTíL L. 51 (1935); see also Montault v. United
States, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 47, 51 (1851) (holding that a treaty is binding as of the date of its
signature); United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127, 148 (1850) (opining that treaties
ìmust be considered as binding from the period of their execution; their operation must be
understood to take effect from that period, unless it shall, by some condition or stipulation in
the compact itself, be postponedî); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 748
(1832) (stating that a treaty relates back to the date of agreement between the two
governments for purposes of intergovernmental rights); Certain German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25), at 29-31.
39. See JONES, supra note 25, at 64-65; Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligation of
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25
GEO. WASH. J. INTíL L. & ECON. 71, 85-87 (1992).
40. Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 780 (citing, and endorsing, Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 2 (Aug. 30), at 57
(Moore, J., dissenting)).
41. See Charme, supra note 39, at 87-88 (citing Summary Records of the 647th
Meeting, [1962] 1 Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 111, 117, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962).
42. Article 9 provided that
[u]nless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, a State on behalf of which a treaty has been
signed is under no duty to perform the obligations stipulated, prior to the coming into force
of the treaty with respect to that State; under some circumstances, however, good faith may
require that pending the coming into force of the treaty the State shall, for a reasonable time
after signature, refrain from taking action which would render performance by any party of
the obligations stipulated impossible or more difficult.

Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 778.
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Vienna Convention, was to redeem the signature by imposing a distinct duty on
signatories. A handful of cases decided following World War I indicated that
signatoriesóincluding, at least arguably, mere signatoriesóassumed some
kind of duty not to disrupt the treatyís operation.44 In that spirit, article 18 of
the Vienna Convention provides that:
43. The Commissionís final draft of 1966 proposed in article 15 that
[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of a proposed treaty
when:
(a) It has agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty, while these
negotiations are in progress;
(b) It has signed the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have
made its intentions clear not to become a party to the treaty;
(c) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of
the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.

Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 202,
U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.
44. The cases commonly cited did not involve mere signatoriesóin the sense of parties
that had signed a treaty, but had not taken the discretionary step of ratifying itóbut instead
involved the duties of state parties who, for one reason or another, were not yet parties to a
treaty in force at the time of the relevant acts. Thus, the Turkish-Greek Mixed Arbitration
Tribunal held that Turkey had acted unlawfully in seizing the property of a Greek national
after Turkey had signed a peace treaty with Greece, but before the treaty had entered into
force, since ì[f]rom the time of the signature of the Treaty and before its entry into force the
contracting parties were under the duty to do nothing which might impair the operation of its
clauses.î Megalidis v. Turkey, 8 RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DES TRIBUNAUX MIXTES 386, 395
(Turkish-Greek Mixed Arb. Trib. 1928), reprinted in 1927/28 ANN. DIG. PUB. INTíL L. 395
(Arnold D. McNair & H. Lauterpacht eds., 1931). The decision is generally regarded as the
only true precedent for the interim obligation. Paul V. McDade, The Interim Obligation
Between Signature and Ratification of a Treaty, 32 NETH. INTíL L. REV. 5, 14 (1985); Martin
A. Rogoff, The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32
ME. L. REV. 263, 277 (1980); cf. JONES, supra note 25, at 81-83 (finding other precedent
wanting). Some commentators have suggested that the decisionís precedential force may be
limited because the conduct was an international delict even absent the treaty. See, e.g.,
Charme, supra note 39, at 81 & n.39; Rogoff, supra, at 277-78.
The greater weakness, in my view, is that these and other cases typically evaluated the
behavior of states that had ultimately become parties to the treaty, rather than those that
definitively had refrained or whose status had not been resolved by the time of the
decisionóthus permitting the tribunals to assume that the states concerned had decided that
observing the treaty served their national interests. Indeed, the realistic prospect of
nonratification is not discussed in these cases, and there are indications that any such
possibility would cut against state responsibility. In one case, an umpire rejected a claim by
a Mexican national for property damages caused by American troops following the signing
of a peace treaty, but prior to Senate ratification. The umpire noted that ìit is well
understood that a peace is not a complete peace until ratified,î and that ìthe ratifying
authority has the power of refusing unless, for that time, it has given up this power
beforehand.î Ignacio Torres v. United States, No. 565 (Zacualtipan Claims, The American
and Mexican Joint Commission 1868), reprinted in 4 JOHN B. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY
3798, 3801 (1898). In language more widely quoted, however, he noted in dicta that ìif a
peace were signed with a moral certainty of its ratification and one of the belligerents
were . . . making grants of land in a province which is to be ceded, before the final
ratification, it would certainly be considered . . . a fraudulent and invalid transaction.î Id.
(emphasis added).
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A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when:
(a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly
delayed.45

As explained in slightly greater detail below, article 18ís terms, and its
influence, are unclear.46 But its dominance as a legal tactic for coping with the
diminished checks on treaty signatures is beyond dispute. The Vienna
Convention made no attempt to revive signature as the legally definitive
juncture for state consent, and there has been little attempt to do so outside the
Convention. Similarly, the Convention bypassed the opportunity to endorse the
civil law principle of culpa in contrahendo, according to which liability may be
imposed for bad faith conduct during negotiations.47 Even if the failure to
adopt such alternatives is of little assistance in interpreting article 18,48 the
choice to adopt exclusively the interim obligation approachówhich has been
followed by commentators and non-parties as well49ómakes it relatively easy
to assess the default rules for treaty formation.
II. SIGNATURE AS A STRATEGIC PROBLEM
With occasional exceptions, the debates in the literature about what to do
with signature in the age of ratification have been based in, and limited by,
doctrinal considerations.50 The focus is understandable, given the usual

45. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 18.
46. See infra Part II.B. For fuller legal analyses of article 18, see Charme, supra note

39; Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States
Courts, 28 VA. J. INTíL L. 281 (1988); Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treatyís Object and
Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Towards Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNATíL L.
283 (2001); McDade, supra note 44, at 9-28; Rogoff, supra note 44.
47. See Charme, supra note 39, at 93-98.
48. See id. at 85-98 (reviewing the implicit failure of the drafters to adopt these
alternatives, but cautioning that they provide ìlimited insight into the content of the
obligationî).
49. For example, as discussed below, the United Statesówhich is not a party to the
Vienna Conventionóhas become convinced that it states customary international law on this
matter, see infra text accompanying note 82, and the same approach has been adopted by the
American Law Institute. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW ß 312(3)
(1987) (ìPrior to the entry into force of an international agreement, a state that has signed the
agreement or expressed its consent to be bound is obliged to refrain from acts that would
defeat the object and purpose of the agreement.î).
50. The problem has not been addressed even in works considering the strategic issues
posed by treaties. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT (1981) (discussing risk-management techniques in the formation of treaties);
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domain and expertise of international lawyers; even the Vienna Convention,
which afforded the opportunity to develop new norms, sought (nominally, at
least) only to state preexisting principles of customary international law.51 But
here, as elsewhere, the doctrinal focus has tended to obscure questions
potentially of concern to states.
A.

Ex Post and Ex Ante Considerations

The essential ambition, from a doctrinal point of view, has been to
establish some legal significance for the signature within the process of
consent.52 The Harvard Research project augmented somewhat its case for an
interim obligation by citing the desirability, as a matter of principle, of
protecting the legitimate expectations of other signatories.53 Sir Hersch
Lauterpachtís report for the International Law Commission echoed that
argument, explaining that the purpose of the rule supporting an interim
obligation on signatories ìis to prohibit action in bad faith deliberately aiming
at depriving the other party of the benefits which it legitimately hoped to
achieve from the treaty and for which it gave adequate consideration.î54 His
arguments for retaining significance for signaturesóand more particularly in
support of the distinct, and unsuccessful, proposal that states should be legally
obliged to seek the ratification of signed treatiesóalso sounded,
unconvincingly, in contractual terms.55

ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION: LAWFUL BREACHES AND
RETALIATIONS (1975) (discussing decisionmaking in terminating and revising treaties).
51. See generally I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
1-26 (1973) (describing tension in the Vienna Convention between progressive development
of customary law and its codification).
52. See, e.g., Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 780 (submitting that ì[i]t is believed
that when a duly authorized plenipotentiary signs a treaty on behalf of his State, the signature
is not a simple formality devoid of all juridical effect and involving no obligation whatever,
moral or legal, on the part of the State whose signature the treaty bearsî). For a more recent
example of this formalistic approach, see Charme, supra note 39, at 89 (arguing that
ìviewing ratification, acceptance or approval as the exclusive means by which a state
manifests consent renders the act of signature meaninglessî; ì[t]hus, any interpretation of
article 18 which exalts the importance of ratification, acceptance or approval to the total
detriment of the role of signature, would run counter to the two-stage modelî). Note,
however, that even if a signature imposes no immediate behavioral constraints on the signing
state, it may nonetheless have legal consequences for the terms and operation of the signed
instrument. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
53. Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 780-81.
54. Lauterpacht Report, supra note 35, at 110.
55. Id. at 109-10.
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Ex post effects.

Lurking within Lauterpachtís doctrinal objections, however, were some
practical concerns. A signatory could be influential, he recalled, in shaping the
procedural and substantive terms of treaties. States making concessions to that
signatory, and lured by its signature into signing themselves, would feel their
concession had been ìmade in vain seeing that the consideration that they
legitimetely [sic] expect[ed] will not be forthcoming.î56 Mere signatories, he
added, were often entitled to a voice in determining the admissibility of another
stateís reservations and with respect to accessions, and it would be ìproperî to
obligate them somehow in exchange for those rights.57
These and kindred accounts seem facially plausible, though their details
require further unpacking. If a state were to take a hard line in negotiations,
and if it were sufficiently worthwhile to secure its participation, other states
might be induced to make concessions in order to secure its signature.
Lauterpachtís concern seemed to be that the hard-line state, left free to ignore
its signature, could act to the disadvantage of other signatories. But in a world
where treaty signature imposed no legal duties, any other signatory would be
equally free to betray its commitments, so the two might deter one anotheróor,
at the very least, permit the betrayed signatory adequate recourse. One might
further assume, of course, that other mere signatories will be victimized
because they behave more honorably, but it is difficult to imagine that
imbalance persisting for long.
The multilateral setting is more difficult to manage. One concern is that
mere signatories can, during the course of treaty negotiations, extract terms that
impose costs on the other signatoriesóbut costs that are not so substantial as to
warrant collective renegotiation of the treatyís terms when it becomes apparent
that the treacherous signatory will not adhere. Second, other signatories may
have actually ratified the treaty, imposing upon themselves an obligation to
adhere to its terms at least with respect to other signatories. Perhaps, in
retrospect, they ought to have waited, but having gone aheadóperhaps in the
accurate expectation that a sufficient number of others would do likewiseó
they may be vulnerable to treaty-inconsistent behavior by mere signatories.58
56. Id. at 110. In the instance of the ICC, for example, the European Commissioner for
External Relations accused the United States of ìrefusing to take yes for an answer,î and
asked ì[w]hy should people make concessions to America if the United States is going to
walk away in any case?î Chris Patten, Why Does America Fear This Court?, WASH. POST,
July 9, 2002, at A21. Others suggested that the U.S. signature had perhaps encouraged
others to sign, and even to ratify. Hilary Charlesworth, Clintonís Policy a Triumph for
Justice, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 18, 2001, at 11.
57. Charlesworth, supra note 56. Under the Rome Statute, for example, reservations
were not permitted, see supra note 24, but signatories were entitled to observer status in the
Assembly of States Parties. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 112.
58. This makes sense, for example, of the allegation that the United States had
developed ìa new ëbrinkmanshipí approach to treaty negotiations, accompanying everyone
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Ex ante effects.

If these scenarios seem overly exotic and anecdotal, more systematic, ex
ante effects can be identified. Where parties are free to exit a relationship at
any point and for any reason, they will under-invest in relianceóthat is, fail to
depend upon the relationshipís perpetuation in ways that might be efficient.59
In the treaty context, such under-investment can take several forms. States may
decide not to negotiate at all if they believe that signatures are unreliable, and
may even invest their resources in activities inconsistent with what would
otherwise be the treaty regimeósuch as in pursuing treaty relations with other
partners, or acting unilaterally. If they elect nonetheless to negotiate, they may
be inclined to agree to less exacting terms than would be ideal, if and to the
extent that those terms would impose fewer costs if one side reneged on its
signature. Finally, states may simply wait to ratify, perhaps mutually deterring
one anotherís ratification.60 As one commentator complained shortly before
the International Law Commission began its codification efforts,
[n]owadays a general practice most harmful to the international relations is the
indefinite postponement of ratification by states instead of actual repudiation
of a treaty. In political agreements, this policy, the so-called ìwatchful
waiting,î is not infrequently applied. Each state waits for the other oneís
ratification before approving the convention. This practice of indefinite
postponement is largely due to the example of the United States. . . . [N]o less
than 288 treaties submitted to the American Senate for ratification during the
period 1789-1931 remained unratified until October, 1942. The American
Government has always favored the conclusion of treaties to be ratified ìas
soon as possible,î so that the Senateís traditional policy of indefinite

else to the ledge and cheering them as they jumped off, but remaining behind to pick and
choose what it liked or didnít like.î The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: The
Consequences of Participation and Nonparticipation, 78 AM. SOCíY INTíL PROC. 270, 282
(1984) [hereinafter The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] (remarks by Frederick S.
Tipson). There is no ledge, in the ordinary sense, as other signatories have not taken any
irreversible step; as explained below, however, it may be more difficult for those who have
ratified to retrace their steps. See infra text accompanying notes 111-12.
Perhaps contemplating this type of problem, the Vienna Convention provides as a
default rule that a treaty, multilateral or otherwise, will be presumed to come into force ìas
soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States.î
Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 24(2). But it is common, instead, for treaties to come
into force earlier, upon the consent of a certain number of signatories. See, e.g., id. art. 84(1)
(ìThe present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of
deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession.î).
59. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance,
48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996); Avery W. Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, in 1
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 425, 427-29 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998); Avery W. Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996).
60. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 83 (2d ed. 2000)
(noting continuing problem of delayed ratification).
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postponement could have full scope to reject conventions which did not
further the interests of the Nation, without recourse to the outright refusal, to
which public opinion is inclined to be somewhat hostile.61

The end result is that otherwise efficient reliance expendituresóthose that
may improve the potential for cooperationówill be placed at risk. A
conventional solution is to ìrewardî reliance by more readily implying the
existence of a binding agreement.62 Such an approach has a number of
drawbacksóit tends to deter the initiation of discussions, for exampleóand
has in any event already been decisively rejected in the treaty context.63
A second solution is to impose liability on those inducing relianceóeither
measured by the degree of reasonable or efficient reliance,64 by strict liability
for the least-cost avoider (i.e., the more powerful bargaining party),65 or by
some other intermediate rule.66 This solution, too, seems to have been rejected
in the treaty context,67 perhaps because the traditional liability inquiries are not
easily adapted to treaties.68 As a practical matter, too, the international legal
61. CAMARA, supra note 22, at 34-35. A contemporary opined:
In recent years, one of the most formidable checks to speedy ratificationónoted particularly
in connection with conventions dealing with economic mattersóhas been the fear of
ratifying governments that they would be placed at a temporary disadvantage in relation to
neighbouring or competing states not yet parties to the convention. Each state hesitates to
make the first move. Rather it prefers to wait and see what step its neighbours will take.

WILCOX, supra note 22, at 115; accord HOLLOWAY, supra note 23, at 47 & n.29 (noting
persistence of problem).
Given concerns about this strategy, commentators who cite the number of treaties
actually declined by the Senateóparticularly as a means of rebutting the Senateís reputation
as the ìgraveyard of treatiesîóare arguably missing the point. See, e.g., David A. Koplow,
Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1353, 1394 & n.176 (1989). The problem persists, instead, if the Senate is
merely ìa place for cold storage.î Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy,
10 MICH. J. INTíL L. 406, 411 (1989). Of course, even were the Senate more efficient, see
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STUDY FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP.
NO. 106-71, at 117-18 (2001) [hereinafter ROLE OF THE SENATE] (asserting that ì[f]ew
treaties languish indefinitely or are returned to the President without approval, and even
fewer are defeated outright by vote of the Senateî); Charles I. Bevans, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 62 AM. J. INTíL L. 149, 162-63
(1968) (tabulating Senate record between 1789 and 1967), one would have to include treaties
not submitted to the Senate for consideration, or held afterwards without ratification by the
President.
62. Cf. Craswell, supra note 59, at 507-43 (describing willingness of courts to find
offer and acceptance, as well as estoppel, in order to redeem reliance).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37 (describing failure of efforts to imply
duty to ratify from signature).
64. See Craswell, supra note 59.
65. See Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, supra note 59, at 428-29.
66. See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 59.
67. See supra text accompanying note 47.
68. Reliance will be hard to verify. Even where the aggrieved party has ratified a
treaty, it may have done so to serve independent national interests, or perhaps (in a
multilateral treaty) in contemplation of a range of other ratifying probabilities. Reliance will
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system is ill suited to provide the right remedies. While states are supposed to
pay for their international delicts,69 international law lacks the kind of efficient,
effective arbiters available for private contractual disputes.70
Notwithstanding these formal barriers, it remains possible that the same
result could be achieved by other means. Lawyers tend to overstate the
significance of formal sanctions at the expense of other means by which
international norms may be enforced.71 States have, in fact, a substantial
incentive to internalize the sort of rules that they ought to: Unsigning with
abandon, or exploitatively, would cause their reputations to suffer, leading
fewer nations to trust them as signatories (and likely impugning, in the bargain,
their more general reputations for honoring commitments). The same
incentives obtain even in the divided-power systems that encouraged the rise of
ratification and the devaluation of signature: Legislatures will be inclined to
approve treaties negotiated by their nationsí executives not only because their
prior mandate has been sought (and complied with), but also because they

also be impossible to monetize. Finally, an analysis of relative bargaining power would go
down a path already rejected as a basis for overturning treaty commitments. In combination,
these features suggest that a liability regime for treaties would fail to create sufficient
incentives for reliance expenditures. It is also possible to err by creating too much liability,
which might adversely affect the exchange of information and impair the ìcourtshipî
between states toward a treaty commitment. See Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and
Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385,
430-33 (1999). But for the reasons just discussed, excessive liability, in the strictly legal
sense, is implausible in this context.
69. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee
on Second Reading, art. 31, U.N. GAOR, Intíl L. Commín, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 4,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001) (providing that ì[t]he responsible State is under an
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act,î
and that ì[i]njury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the
internationally wrongful act of a Stateî); e.g., Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No.9, at 21 (July 26) (ìIt is a principle of international law that the breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation
therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.î).
70. Though international compensation schemes have flourished, they remain
exceptional in character, and rely ultimately on compliance that is essentially voluntary in
character. Cf. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (noting that, while a treaty may
provide for individual redress, it ìdepends for the enforcement of its provisions on the
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction
becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party
chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that
with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.î).
71. George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J.
INTíL L. 319, 321-22 (1998) (describing differing perspectives of political economists and
international lawyers with respect to enforcement mechanisms).
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desire to maintain the nationís reputation for the sake of future commitments.72
If this is plausible, perhaps the notion that states should heed their signatures is
less a matter of customary international law (as even the Vienna Convention
assumed) than the result of sheer self-interest,73 and the unsigning of the Rome
Statute was simply aberrational.
Self-interest of this kind may well explain the novelty of the ICC episode
and establish a safeguard of continuing importance, but it is unlikely to be a
complete solution. States might be independently motivated to impose
intermediate obligations on themselves, perhaps not unlike those described by
article 18 of the Vienna Convention, as a means of demonstrating that they are
credible partners (and, in divided-power systems, as a way of according the
agent some but not too much binding authority). But reputation is a complex
construct,74 and its disciplining function surely depends in part on the existence
and clarity of rules permitting or prohibiting the conduct in question.75 It is
worth examining, accordingly, how well the interim obligationóthe only
means by which the Vienna Convention addresses mere signatories, and an
exemplar of the kind of rules states might otherwise constructóperforms.
B.

The (In)Adequacy of Interim Obligations

Article 18 was developed, as has been recounted, more for formalistic
reasonsóas a means of preserving the legal significance of the signatureóthan
as a remedy for the particular ex post and ex ante effects just described. Yet it
is nonetheless possible to rationalize the interim obligation as being an answer
of sorts: By reducing the difference between nonratification and ratification,
the interim obligation reduces the risk of exploitation. If signatories are

72. Even with differing preferences, a nationís legislature and its executives profit
from the ability to make this kind of commitment. See LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC
COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 39-41 (2000).
73. Professors Goldsmith and Posner have been vigorous about insisting on this
distinction. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999). Contra, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52
DUKE L.J. 559 (2002) (arguing that the distinction between obligations under customary
international law and self-interest is overstated).
74. Compare, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 73, at 1135 (noting generally that a
ìreputation for compliance with international law is not necessarily the best meansóand
certainly not the only meansófor accomplishing foreign policy objectivesî), and Jack
Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 959, 985 (2000) (book review) (suggesting that the value of establishing a reputation
for obeying international law is exaggerated as a diplomatic tool), with Swaine, Rational
Custom, supra note 73 (relying on reputation for legal obedience in defending consistency of
international law theory with rational choice models).
75. See, e.g., James D. Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal
Systems in International Politics, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S41, S43 (observing that ì[r]eciprocal
enforcement depends on a shared understanding of what conduct is unacceptable and what
consequences follow from such conductî).
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encumbered by duties that meaningfully approximate those imposed on parties,
their incentives to defect from ratificationóthat is, to seek out or to maintain
status as a mere signatoryómay be diminished.
Having said that, there are evident problems with attributing such a
function to article 18. For one, the interim obligationís substantive scope is
probably not well tailored to this purpose. The Vienna Convention does not
suggest any easily administered test for determining a treatyís ìobject and
purposeî or, for that matter, for assessing when a stateís actions would ìdefeatî
it,76 and there is little in the way of clarifying practice.77 Some commentators
regard compliance with article 18 as turning on the observance of major or
indispensable treaty provisions, an approach relatively well suited to the abovedescribed functional approach.78 But the interim obligation is more commonly
understood to safeguard against acts that would disable the mere signatory (or
others) from complying with the treaty once it entered into forceóin an attempt
to maintain, as relevant, the status quo ante.79 If interim obligations are so
limited, they can only correspond imperfectly with any goal of reducing the gap
between mere signatories and ratifiers. The interim obligation does not, in any

76. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 60, at 94 (noting uncertain nature of obligationís
extent); Charme, supra note 39, at 74 (finding article 18 ìvague and amorphous,î and
lacking ìinherent value,î but somehow virtuous); McDade, supra note 44, at 45-47 (noting
lack of clarity in interim obligation); Rogoff, supra note 44, at 297 (noting that ì[t]he
content of the obligation as it emerges from application by international tribunals is
extremely uncertain and there are few interpretational guidesî).
77. See AUST, supra note 60, at 94 (noting that there ìis virtually no practice in the
application of the provisionî).
78. See, e.g., McDade, supra note 44, at 42. Such an approach is consistent with that
taken to reservations. See infra text accompanying note 85 (discussing opinion of the
Human Rights Committee).
79. Anthony Aust, for example, stressed that a state that has not ratified is not under a
duty to comply with the treaty, nor to refrain from acts inconsistent with its provisions, but
instead need only avoid ìanything which would affect its ability fully to comply with the
treaty once it has entered into force.î AUST, supra note 60, at 94; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 49, ß 312 cmt. i; Klabbers, supra note 46, at
293-94 (rejecting provision-centered approach as inconsistent with the organic focus of
article 18, and approaching making signature the equivalent of ratification); Rogoff, supra
note 44, at 297 (stressing that ìthe obligation in its present form imposes no affirmative duty
upon a signatory to do certain acts or to carry out specific provisions of the treatyî); id. at
298-99 (concluding that ìthe purpose of the rule is to prevent a signatory from claiming the
benefits to which it is entitled under the treaty while at the same time engaging in acts that
would materially reduce the benefits to which the other signatory or signatories are
entitledî).
The argument in favor of this lesser obligation is often based on limits in the customary
precedent, or first principles. But it also appears consistent with the Vienna Conventionís
distinction of a treatyís ìprovisional application,î which parties-to-be are required to observe
only when they have so agreed. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(1) (providing
that ì[a] treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if: (a)
the treaty itself so provides; or (b) the negotiating States have in some other manner so
agreedî).
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event, attempt to establish a degree of interim responsibility proportionate to
the risk of defection and its costs.
Nor, for that matter, does the Vienna Conventionís formal reach inspire
confidence. The Convention applies only to treaties concluded by states after
the Convention has entered into force with respect to them.80 There is some
dispute as to whether article 18 codifies customary international law that would
independently bind nonparties;81 given the ambiguity in article 18, it is
unsurprising that the answers vary, and perhaps meaningfully. For example,
the United Statesówhich, coincidentally enough, has signed but not ratified the
Vienna Conventionóhas represented that it regards article 18 as reflecting
customary international law.82 Its acknowledgements have been opaque,
however, as to how it understands the interim obligation, and it remains free to
claim that it follows customary international law, and even article 18, without
acquiescing in a state partyís interpretation of what the interim obligation
requires.
Finally, the interim obligation is also not easily enforced. Neither the
Vienna Convention nor customary international law creates any institutional
mechanism for policing such obligations. Given that a minority of states
acquiesce in the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,83

80. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 4. For fuller consideration, see E.W.
Vierdag, The Law Governing Treaty Relations Between Parties to the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties and States Not Party to the Convention, 76 AM. J. INTíL L. 779 (1982).
This has a potentially substantial impact on the Vienna Conventionís application. See The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 58, at 282 (remarks by Maria
Frankowska) (estimating, based primarily on data from 1979, that less than half of the major
treatymaking states (as of 1984) were parties to the Vienna Convention, 70% of the treaty
activity of Vienna Convention parties was conducted with nonparties, and only 10% of
bilateral treaties were covered). The number of parties to the Vienna Convention has
increased considerably, of course, but the point remains that gaps in the Conventionís
coverage reduce its application geometrically.
81. See AUST, supra note 60, at 94 (noting uncertainty); GLENNON, supra note 19, at
171-72 (noting controversy, but concluding that the better view is that the Convention
reflects customary international law ìas it existed at the time the Vienna Convention was
adoptedî); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1945-1986, at 149
(noting that article 18 is ìhighly controversialî due to its perceived departure from
customary international law, and was not included among the articles for discussion in
connection with the 1986 Vienna Conference on the treaties of international organizations);
SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 22, 38-40 (noting controversy, and opining that article 18 at least
represented a ìprogressive developmentî in customary international law).
82. Robert E. Dalton, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Consequences
for the United States, 78 AM. SOCíY INTíL PROC. 276, 278 (1984) (citing representations by
Secretary of State William P. Rogers in 1971 and Ambassador Elliot Richardson in 1979);
see also GLENNON, supra note 19, at 172 & n.54 (citing representation by Secretary of State
John Hay).
83. For a collection of current declarations, see Intíl Court of Justice, Declarations
Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm (last visited Mar. 13,
2003).
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the only formal dispute resolution process available in most cases is due to the
particular treaty in questionóto which a mere signatory is not, by definition, a
party. Where an institution has been made competent to resolve similar
questions, the results have not been inspiring. The International Court of
Justice, addressing the subject of reservations to the Genocide Convention,
emphasized in a vague way the obligations of a signatory, but acknowledged
that they ìnecessarily var[y] in individual cases.î84 More recently, the Human
Rights Committee took a broad, and arguably ad hoc, view of the kind of
reservations that would be incompatible with the ìobject and purposeî of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a question prompted by
article 19 of the Vienna Convention.85 Its inquiry, however, prompted some
state parties to object both to the Committeeís substantive conclusions and to
its assertion of authority to resolve the matteróat the evident expense of the
role for state objections.86
Arguably the strongest evidence of the interim obligationís inadequacy lies
in state practice. To be sure, a mere signatoryís failure to comport with a treaty
may engender protests,87 and some states have appeared willing to comply with
a treaty notwithstanding the lack of ratification.88 But it is easy to explain such
84. Advisory Opinion No. 12, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 28 (May 28) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention].
85. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights General Comment 24: Issues Relating to
Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994).
86. See, e.g., Observations by the United States of America on General Comment No.
24 (52), U.N. Doc. A/50/40, vol. 1, annex VI, at 126-27 (1996).
87. See Klabbers, supra note 46, at 284-85 (citing example of criticisms by activists of
Angolaís decision to use landmines after signing the Anti-Landmine Convention).
Academics, indeed, are adept at detecting circumstances in which the interim obligation may
be invoked against dilatory ratifiers like the United States. See, e.g., Michael McDonnell,
Cluster Bombs over Kosovo: A Violation of International Law?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 107
(2002) (claiming that the use by the United States of an indiscriminate weapon would violate
its duties as a signatory of the First Protocol).
88. Thus, in the absence of Senate consent to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
II, President Reagan indicated that the United States would ìrefrain from actions which
undercut [existing agreements] so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint,î but the
terms of his representation seemed to turn more on how the United States perceived its
interests rather than on the existence of any obligation imposed by international law.
GLENNON, supra note 19, at 169.
In the Clinton Administration, Secretary of State Albright informed foreign
governments that ìthe United States is legally bound to observe the nuclear test-ban treaty,
despite the Senateís rejection of the pact.î Scott, supra note 15, at 1448 (citations omitted).
As noted above, the position that article 18 entails a duty to observe the treaty proper is a
minority view, and the State Department later clarified that the interim obligation did not
require such fidelity:
[T]here is a misunderstanding that needs to be clarified. The president is not claiming that
the United States is bound by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We cannot be bound by a
treaty that has not been ratified and that is not in force.
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behavior as serving political objectives independent of the interim obligation.
States have not in general behaved as though the interim obligation imposes a
burden. The strongest evidence of salience are cases in which states considered
interim obligations as one reason among many for failing to sign a treaty,
though even there concern about interim obligations is difficult to distinguish
from less-transient substantive objections.89
The evidence contraindicating the efficacy of interim obligations seems
more persuasive. The number of instances in which states are mere signatories
has remained high, and in many cases such instances have persisted for a
prolonged period without significant legal controversy. It is somewhat
surprising, if the interim obligation had teeth, for such situations to have
persistedóat least for treaties like the Genocide Convention, in which a
signatory might have substantial concern about being called to account. One
might expect, at the very least, that states would have been involved in more
conflicts concerning the scope of their interim obligations, and that more
allegations of breach would have been airedóunless the rules were clear,
which they are not.
Even the recent controversy involving the ICC, which brought the issue of
interim obligations to the fore, demonstrates their inadequacy. The evidence
regarding article 18ís influence on U.S. behavior prior to unsigning is at least
mixed. On the one hand, the United Statesís decision to sign the Rome Statute,
[W]hat we are saying is that as a signatory, there is an understanding in the international
community that if youíre a signatory and you intend to seek ratification later, that you not
take steps to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. That is the legal term of art. . . .
[W]e are going to seek a second chance to get approval for the Comprehensive Test Ban.
And in the meantime, the president is going to continue pursuing the policy that has been in
effect since 1992; that is, not to conduct any nuclear explosions.
And let me be clear. As a signatory that has not ratified the treaty, the point is that weíre
not obligated to abide by every term and provision of an elaborate treaty document; but with
respect to the basic object and purpose of the treaty not to test nuclear explosions, that is the
basic object and purpose.

U.S. State Dept. Briefing, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 5, 1999 (remarks of Jamie Rubin).
Notwithstanding the clarification, the overall impression was that the President was
essentially electing the degree of obligation as a matter of national policy.
89. In considering the Law of the Sea Convention, for example, the United Kingdom
reportedly considered the interim obligation as a factor counseling against signature, though
it ultimately decided to decline for unrelated reasons. See SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 274.
The United States, too, had substantive concerns with respect to the interim obligation,
though it in fact decided to sign the Convention. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 58, at 284 (remarks by Frederick S. Tipson). Just to confuse matters
further, after the Convention went into force the United Kingdom elected to become a party
and the United States, as yet, has not. United Nations, Department of Oceans and the Law of
the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of
Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements
as at [sic] 12 November 2001, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (updated Dec. 10, 2002). For a brief summary of
U.S. policy, see Marjorie Anne Brown, The Law of the Sea Convention and U.S. Policy
(Feb. 14, 2001) (Cong. Research Serv. Issue Brief 95010), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Marine/mar-16.cfm.
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while having little expectation of ratifying it as such, seems facially
inconsistent with an understanding that it thereby assumed a burdensome
obligation.90 On the other hand, in withdrawing its signature, U.S. officials did
alludeóat least as a secondary matteróto the virtue of avoiding interim
obligations.91 Although it is hard to disentangle the Bush Administrationís
motivations, its domestic and international stance against the ICCóalong with
concerted opposition in the Senateówere probably sufficient reasons,
independent of its interim obligations, to warrant unsigning. The need to
maintain a consistent message was made all the more acute by the U.S. agenda
of pursuing so-called article 98(2) bilateral agreements to further ensure the
exemption of U.S. personnel from ICC jurisdiction, an agenda arguably
inconsistent with any attempt to maintain that the Rome Statute was
workable.92
Whatever its motivation, the fact of unsigning provides the keenest lesson.
Article 18, as noted previously, does not require that the interim obligation be
observed for all eternity, but instead only ìuntil [the signatory] shall have made
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.î93 There is no guidance
on how this intention may be made manifest,94 and while it may be absurd to
contend that violating a treatyís object and purpose itself constitutes an
adequate signal of that intention,95 there is no reason to believe that the
procedure is particularly burdensome.96 The bottom line, in any case, is that if
90. This was also evident in some of the remarks by Secretary of State-nominee Colin
Powell, reflected in Wedgwood, supra note 24, at 195-96.
91. Thus Ambassador Prosper, responding to a query as to why the United States
unsigned the treaty rather than simply failing to ratify, cited the interim obligation, indicating
that the United States
to maintain our flexibilityónot only to protect our interests but to pursue alternative judicial
mechanismsódecided to make clear that we will not be part of this treaty and thus be able to
take different approaches that may be different to the object and purpose [of] the ICC treaty.

Prosper, supra note 1. The interim obligation was not, however, cited in the notification by
Under Secretary of State Bolton, supra note 1, nor in the remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld,
supra note 1, nor by Under Secretary of State Grossman, supra note 1.
92. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2). But see Scheffer, supra note 9, at 59
(arguing that U.S. signature was intended to enhance the ease of securing article 98(2)
agreements).
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 18(a).
94. The procedure appears to have had no precedent in customary international law.
See McDade, supra note 44, at 23-24.
95. But see United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the
Conference, 1st & 2d Sess., at 100, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./39/11/Add.2 (1968-1969) (reporting
statement by French delegate that ìthe most obvious way for a State to make clear its
intention not to become a party to the treaty was for it to frustrate the object of the treatyî).
96. A more legitimate question concerns whether the refusal to submit a treaty for
legislative consent, or the legislatureís rejection of a treaty, constitutes a sufficient signal in
the absence of a more formal notice of the kind provided with respect to the Rome Statute.
See, e.g., Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 2d 168,
175 n.3 (D.P.R.) (asserting interim obligation to adhere to the ìpurposes and principlesî of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea based on presidential signature, at
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a signatory feels burdened by the interim obligation, and contemplates taking
acts that might be viewed as violating a treatyís object and purpose, it can
quickly disengage itself. This ease of exit greatly limits the potential force of
the interim obligation. Now that unsigning has been deployed, states interested
in pressing mere signatories into compliance must weigh the possibility that
their actions will widen the gap between ratification and nonratification by
driving signatories to unsign.
This kind of complete exitóas opposed to the failure of signatories to
progress toward ratificationómay have been the most upsetting to international
expectations. The practice of letting signed treaties linger, without ratifying or
unsigning them, seems to have created an expectation that the treaty process
was a one-way ratchet: A mere signatoryís hesitance might mean that its
participation in a treaty would not (at least for a time) be fully realized, but
once it had signed, it would not, and could not, turn its back on the matter.97
Such an understanding would, in theory, help ease the transition from signature
to ratification, and ensure consistency with the priority on securing even
imperfect adherence to multilateral treatiesóa point emphasized by the
International Court of Justiceís tolerance for state reservations and, notably, its
characterization of signature as ìa first step toward ratification.î98 This vision
is, of course, strictly inconsistent with article 18ís apparent tolerance for exit,
and contemplating that possibility makes the potentially perverse effects of
interim obligations immediately evident.
C.

Implications

The resulting predicament adds a novel twist to the conventional account
concerning the enforcement of international obligations. Vague standards like
the interim obligation, it is thought, may be intentionally selectedónot
incidentally, because they permit negotiators to achieve agreement where it
least ìpending ratification or rejection by the Senateî), affíd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 297
(1st Cir. 1999). Though a full exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is enough to note their practical implications. Were rejection by the U.S. Senate
enough, for example, some might argue that a re-signing by the President would reinstate the
interim obligation, at least assuming that were permissible under the relevant treaty. See
Garrett Epps, Restarting the CTBT, NATION, May 15, 2000, at 5 (urging just such a course
with respect to the CTBT). Such a rule would also be inconsistent with U.S. domestic
practice, under which the Senate ordinarily remains seized of a treaty even after having
rejected itóand on at least one occasion, reconsidered the treaty and approved it just days
after having initially rejected it. See ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 61, at 8, 12, 144-45.
97. This line of thought is implicit in some of the commentary on the United Statesís
initial signing, as well as its unsigning, of the Rome Statute. See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra
note 56, at 11 (asserting that since ì[e]ven signing a treaty imposes a general obligation not
to act in a way that is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty . . . the US is
committed to the creation of an independent and impartial International Criminal Courtî).
98. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 84, at
28.
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would not otherwise be possible.99 By the same token, however, they are less
likely to prove adequate in any deeper efforts at cooperation, which create
greater incentives to defect.100
The Rome Statute illustrates this tension in treaty formulation even in the
processes of treaty formation, and suggests the difficulties of achieving a
universal solution by tinkering with the interim obligation. The potential
upside to strengthening mere signatoriesí obligations, to be sure, is obvious
enough. Because the ICC imposed potentially significant costs on signatories,
the risk of cheatingóeven on lesser, interim obligations, to the extent they
retain meaningócannot be discounted. The reputational cost of such cheating,
moreover, would be low if there were no clear, shared understanding of what
constituted a violation. Finally, more defined or more easily enforced interim
obligations might be desirable as a means of reducing the strategic advantage
that mere signatories retain over state parties, and thus encouraging complete
subscription.
Any resulting attrition among signatories, it may also be argued, is not
invariably a bad thing. Strengthening obligations helps to identify states that
may be unwilling to abide by a treaty, and to that extent causes precisely the
right states to drop out.101 But such a depiction may also be overly static.
Mere signatories may be undergoing a process of adjustment and adaptation,
either internationally (through norm internalization, for example, or by
negotiating changes in the treatyís terms) or domestically (by selling the treaty
to domestic audiences), and may legitimately be uncertain as to how either
process will pan outórather than being, say, uncertain as to whether or not
they would choose to comply should they ratify.
States may also, at least on occasion, be less concerned with imposing and
enforcing equivalent obligations than with increasing the sum of compliance
with a set of norms. The Rome Statute is part of a modern wave of treaties
oriented toward universal participation,102 and it is well understood that such
99. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 71, at 330 (observing that to political economists, ìit
is often a sensible strategy to claim ambiguity as a cover for noncompliance,î and ì[t]hey
also suspect that ambiguity is often built into the agreement intentionally as a device that
negotiators can use strategically to reap the political benefits of reaching an agreement when
one might otherwise not be achievedî); id. at 343 (observing that ìambiguity in treaty
language and claims of incapacity are often instrumentally useful for States,î whichó
ì[w]ithin certain boundsîómay ìdeliberately choose how ambiguous to make treaties and
how much oversight capacity they will employ in connection with a given agreementî).
100. George W. Downs, David M. Roche & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INTíL ORG. 379, 380, 384-87 (1996).
101. See Morrow, supra note 75, at S48-50, S57-58.
102. See Phillipe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court, 46 MCGILL L.J. 255, 259
(2000) (accounting, by Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court, of the tension between ìa strong statute and strong support
from the international community,î with emphasis on the desire for ìwidespread signature
and ratificationî and the goal of achieving ìsupport that is as universal as possibleî); cf. Jose
E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INTíL & COMP. L. REV. 213, 220-21 (2002)
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an objective entails greater flexibility as to substantive standards and
noncompliance.103 If the goal of background treaty rules is to encourage states
to make reliance investments in their desired regimes, it is important to ensure
that those rules are not unduly biased against investments in breadth rather than
depth of cooperation.
III. STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS
Understanding the range of variables involved suggests that the most
promising solutions to the problem of unsigning may be treaty-specific or, at
most, take the form of default rules. But for the reasons just discussed, it may
be difficult to establish any clearer, universal set of expectations for mere
signatoriesóand hazardous, to the extent it generalizes about the relative
virtues of treaty breadth and depth. Even with respect to individual treaties,
negotiators may find it difficult enough to find common ground with respect to
partiesí ultimate obligations, and have little tasteóand, if ambiguity is thought
advantageous, little genuine desireófor trying to resolve which treaty
obligations are paramount for mere signatories.
Another set of strategies would try to reduce the incidence of mere
signature. One such option involves establishing a deadline for signature,
beyond which states desiring to participate in a treaty regime must accede
completely, domestic ratification and all.104 Narrowing the window of
opportunity for signature necessarily reduces the ease of state entry, and may
thus impose costs in terms of breadth of participation. The experience with this
mechanism under the Rome Statute, moreover, suggests that it may simply
encourage hasty signaturesóPresident Clintonís signature was not only in the
ìtwilight of his Administration,î but also on the ìlast possible day for a

(describing Rome Statute as exemplary of broad-based treatymaking in organizations
ìaspiring to universal or nearly univeral membershipî).
103. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 84, at
21-22 (concluding that the ìvery wide degree of participation envisagedî by the Genocide
Convention, and the reliance on majority voting in determining its provisions, called for
ìflexibilityî in establishing rules for its operation); id. at 23 (characterizing Convention as
pursuing the ìcommon interest,î such that the ìindividual advantages or disadvantages to
States,î and ìthe maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties,î
are substantially irrelevant). The same approach may be evidenced by the treatment of
virtual reservations to the Rome Statute. See supra note 24.
104. The Vienna Convention itself leaves the choice of ratification, accession, or other
means of consent wholly to the negotiating parties. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7,
art. 11; see also id. arts. 12-15 (detailing provisions for means of expressing consent, but
providing for few practical differences). The relationship between ratification and accession
has proven arcane, see, e.g., JONES, supra note 25, at 124-32 (discussing controversies), but
in modern practice the distinction typically arises when a state has missed a deadline for
signature or otherwise been denied the opportunity to sign. See AUST, supra note 60, at 88.
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signature without ratificationî105óand thus increase the likelihood of shallow
engagement and eventual exit. A second such option, limiting the rights of
signatories, focuses less on reducing the initial population of mere signatories
than on encouraging them to make the transition to party status. Nonetheless,
limiting signatoriesí rights is likely to have a direct effect on entry, and even
ratification, by decreasing the incentive for states to sign.106
A third possibility would be to limit the time available for ratification by
signatories. States may be encouraged to ratify early if doing so is
prestigious,107 but it seems implausible that prestige alone could serve as the
basis for additional leverage. Negotiators may instead create an absolute
deadline or establish a maximum period between a stateís signature and the
tendering of its final consent. Doing either would, in theory, reduce the period
during which discrepant obligations applied, and encourage signatories to
progress more rapidly toward ratification. These options are available under
the existing law of treaties, but are rarely exploited,108 perhaps largely because
of the collective interest in maximizing the opportunities for ratification.109
But there are also practical impediments to limiting opportunities for
ratification. On the rare occasions when absolute deadlines have been
established, as within the League of Nations, they have later been modified in
order to enhance the treatyís scope, and thus may lack credibility.110 An
individuated limit may encounter the different problem that, given the
widespread possibilities for treaty accession, any state finding its signature

105. Wedgwood, supra note 24, at 193; see Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 125(1)
(providing that ìthe Statute shall remain open for signature in New York, at United Nations
Headquarters, until 31 December 2000î). But cf. Scheffer, supra note 9, at 68 (concluding
that ì[t]he Presidentís decision represented work on the ICC throughout his Administration,
and thus was anything but a rushed decision at the end of December 2000î).
106. That tradeoff may not be inevitable, as suggested by the striking example of the
practice of objecting to reservations: Mere signatories obtain the right to object, but the
status of their objections is contingent upon their own ratification. See Advisory Opinion on
Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 84, at 28 (ì[W]ithout ratification,
signature does not make the signatory State a party to the Convention; nevertheless, it
establishes a provisional status in favour of that State. . . . Pending ratification, the
provisional status created by signature confers upon the signatory a right to formulate as a
precautionary measure objections which have themselves a provisional character. These
would disappear if the signature were not followed by ratification, or they would become
effective on ratification.î). This particular variant is unavailable, of course, where
reservations are impermissible, as in the case of the Rome Statute.
107. Cf. AUST, supra note 60, at 81 (speculating that a state may ratify before
implementing legislation has been enacted ìso that it can say that it has been one of the first
to ratify, and thereby gain kudos at home and abroadî).
108. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 60, at 83 (noting that ì[i]t is not usual to set a deadline
for ratificationî); ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 88 (1938).
109. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 60, at 81.
110. See JONES, supra note 25, at 86 n.2; WILCOX, supra note 22, at 143-44 (describing
experience of the League of Nations with the Conference on the Exportation of Hides, Skin,
and Bones).
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lapsed may simply re-sign. Establishing any more general principle, like
desuetude for signature, would likely run into similar obstacles.
Using interim obligations to approximate partiesí obligations, or otherwise
attempting to encourage ratification, seems for these reasons to be of limited
value in answering the unsigning problem. A more promising avenue, in my
view, is instead to reduce somewhat the advantages that mere signatories have
with respect to exit. Treaty parties generally retain, of course, the opportunity
to withdraw from their obligations.111 Where such a right exists, but no
conditions are stipulated, the Vienna Convention provides that no less than
twelve monthsí notice is required.112 The result, as noted earlier, is that a mere
signatory can exit more expeditiously than can a party with more substantial
and well-defined obligations.
It seems wholly reasonable, and feasible, to extend the partiesí regimen to
mere signatories: Where a signatory wishes to provide notice of its intention
not to ratify under article 18, that noticeís effect would be delayed for twelve
months, or for whatever period provided for party withdrawal under the
particular treaty. The notion is not entirely unprecedented. Uncertain as to the
continuing force of the ABM Treaty after the Soviet Unionís dissolution, the
Clinton Administration negotiated and signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) purporting to extend the treaty to the newly independent
states, but refrained from submitting the MOU to likely defeat in the Senate.
The Bush Administration, in turn, faced an ABM Treaty of uncertain
continuing authority (but which its officials had proclaimed dead upon the
Soviet Unionís breakup) and an MOU that at most imposed an interim
obligation under article 18. Although it had the option, by its lights, of
disavowing the ABM Treaty and unsigning the MOU with immediate effect, it
instead elected to comply with the ABM Treatyís original requirements for
withdrawalówhich entailed notice and a delay in the entry into force.113
111. Under the Vienna Convention, however, the right to withdraw is not universally
available; if the right is not specifically afforded within a particular treatyís terms, it is
unavailable unless it can be established that the parties intended to permit withdrawal or such
a right may be implied by the nature of the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art.
56(1). While this may seem to be an undue, if self-imposed, constraint on national
sovereignty, the inability to withdraw makes perfect sense in the context of treaties, like
those settling borders, in which permanence is highly prized. But see Setear, An Iterative
Perspective, supra note 29, at 208-09 (querying distinction among types of treaties with
respect to withdrawal or denunciation, while advocating approach biased against withdrawal
from or denunciation of any type of treaty).
112. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 56(2).
113. See supra note 15 (citing withdrawal notices). The rationale was best laid out by
Robert Turner, whose testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated
the case for regarding the ABM Treaty as defunct, noted the interim obligation not to betray
the object and purpose of the MOU, and argued for the discretionary act of notifying
withdrawal in accord with the ABM Treatyís original terms. See National Missile Defense
and the ABM Treaty (Part 2), Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
107th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 24, 2001) (testimony of Robert F. Turner); Robert F. Turner,
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The better question may be how such a norm might be more generally
implemented, given that unsigning states may not always exhibit such largesse.
The most aggressive approach would be to infer a default requirement of
unsigning lead-time from the Vienna Convention. As previously noted, article
18 does not specify any particular method of providing notice of the intent not
to become a party to a treaty, and might be amenable to importing a default
method stipulated elsewhere, such as for withdrawal. The difficulty, however,
is that the interim obligation is supposed to last only from the point of signature
ìuntilî the mere signatory has made its intention clear, which is facially
inconsistent with the automatic implication of an additional twelve-month
buffer.114 It may also be argued that unsigning without adequate lead-time is
itself inconsistent with a treatyís object and purpose, but that argument seems
to depend overmuch on the minority position as to the provisional, treatymimicking character of the interim obligation. Any attempt to find a default
rule within the Vienna Convention, finally, would not only be susceptible to
telling criticisms as to treaty construction, but would certainly exceed any
requirement imposed by customary international law, and thus would fail to
bind nonparties like the United States.
The surer course would be to incorporate such terms on a treaty-by-treaty
basis. Article 18 does not, on its face, permit derogation by the parties to a
particular treaty, but one may reasonably argue that the greater power of
permitting parties to make signature determinative of consent includes the
power to subject signatories to stricter conditions than those imposed by article
18. Such an approach would have at least two distinct advantages. First, while
the strategic considerations discussed in Part I counsel in favor of limiting the
advantage mere signatories may have over ratifiers in multilateral treaties, they
have far less application to bilateral treaties, suggesting that the one-size-fits-all
approach in article 18 may be inappropriate to the problem of unsigning.
Second, there is no reason to believe that the balance of considerationsóin
particular, the fear of deterring would-be signatories through excessive
restrictions on exit, versus the concern that mere signatories may be in a
position to exploit ratifiers or even to slow down or halt the treatyís entry into
forceówill be the same for every kind of treaty. Indeed, while I have
suggested that the period for withdrawal may be easily borrowed in order to
establish the lead time for unsigning, it is by no means obvious that that is the
right answer for each and every strategic situation.

National Missile Defense and the 1972 ABM Treaty, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 807 (2002)
(reprising testimony).
114. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 18.
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CONCLUSION
Unsigning, in short, should be acknowledged as a legitimate and
understandable course of action under the Vienna Convention, albeit one that
may impair the successful pursuit of multilateral treaties. If little is asked of
mere signatories, the risk that unsigning will become endemic is low. But with
the continued popularity of multilateral conventions, and the proliferation of
parties actively engaged in making and enforcing international law, it is
becoming steadily less likely that states will be able to maintain any kind of
collective repose. Under these circumstances, unsigning may well become
more common, and in the process threaten the possibilities for international
cooperation.
Repairing the situation may require more sustained reflection on the
synergistic effects on incentives for the various levels of entry, the several
kinds of exit, and the desired intensity of treaty commitments. But
acknowledging the strategic issues involved, and moving past more doctrinaire
legal analysis, is an important first step.

